A LAW THAT EVERY WORKING WOMAN SHOULD KNOW (Sexual Harassment At Workplace)

Sexual Harassment At Workplace 

usually one approach the court for own interest but there are some case which were beneficiary for   the whole nation. out of those cases one case was banwari devi case or vishakha case. this case forced Indian parliament pass the law against sexual harassment  at workplace .
  BUT Prior to the Visakha Guidelines, the workplace was dangerous for many women, especially in the case of sexual harassment. In 1992, Bhanwari Devi was gang-raped by upper caste men in her village as she tried to raise her voice against child marriage. Her vagina  swab was taken from her body 48 hours after the incident due to gross negligence. Ideally, this should be done within 24 hours. Shockingly, the judge presiding over his case (this was the seventh judge after the six others were removed) acquitted the accused, even stating, "Since the perpetrators were upper caste men , so rape could not happen. " This happened because Bhanwari was from a lower caste. After the acquittal over the acquittal, Visakha and some other women's groups filed a public interest litigation against the state of Rajasthan and the Union of India, forcing the latter to adopt Visakha guidelines, which now protect the working Women all over the country.

The Supreme Court had  made it compulsory for every state, union territory and regulatory body to implement a legal mechanism for implementing the guidelines issued in the 'Visakha' case, allowing employers to prevent sexual harassment. To realize and ensure this. Women at their workplaces.

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court clarified that the guidelines issued in the Visakha case should be implemented not only in form but also in substance to ensure a safe and secure place and environment for a woman. Could. His workplace. The bench also states that there is a lack of a law and proper mechanism to address complaints of sexual harassment of women, such as women doctors / nurses or architects and even domestic workers and in other cases, because often Women are victims of sexual harassment. Often reluctant to accept it due to some social stigma / fanaticism, they think that it affects their dignity and respect in society.

Sexual harassment at workplaces is an expression of the continuing gender discrimination in society that is rarely recognized. The bench has also stated that if there exists a case for modifying old acts and bringing in new laws to protect women from indecency, humiliation and humiliation occurring in their workplaces, homes and other places, it would certainly Will react To educate girls and women in all fields and protect them from violence in all forms (eg domestic violence, sexual harassment at work); latter on  law was enacted by the Parliament namely Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 .

KNOW THE EXACT LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

 WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS PER LAW?

AS PER LAW OF 2013 SEXUAL HARASSMENT INCLUDES:

• .Sexually suggestive remarks or innuendos; serious or repeated offensive remarks; .inappropriate questions or remarks about a person’s sex life
• .Display of sexist or offensive pictures, posters, MMS, SMS, WhatsApp, or emails
• Intimidation, threats, blackmail around sexual favours; also, threats, intimidation or retaliation against an employee who speaks up about these
• Unwelcome social invitations with sexual overtones, commonly seen as flirting
• Unwelcome sexual advances

According to the LAW, “unwelcome behaviour” is experienced when the victim feels bad or powerless; it causes anger/sadness or negative self-esteem. It adds unwelcome behaviour is one which is “illegal, demeaning, invading, one-sided and power based”.

The Act specifies five circumstances that amount to sexual harassment. These are:

• Implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her employment
• Implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment
• Implied or explicit threat about her present or future employment status
•  Interference with her work or creating an offensive or hostile work environment
• Humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.

Who is an ‘aggrieved woman’ as per the Act?

According to the Handbook on Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace, the Act recognises the right of every woman to a safe and secure workplace environment “irrespective of her age or employment/work status”. Any woman coming to any workplace “whether in the capacity of regular, temporary, adhoc, or daily wages basis” is protected under the Act.

It further says such women can be “engaged directly or through an agent including a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer”; they may be working for remuneration, or on a voluntary basis, a contract worker, probationer, trainee, apprentice, or called by any other such name.

The identity of the woman, respondent, witness, any information on the inquiry, recommendation and action taken, cannot be made public, as per the Act.

How to file a complaint of sexual harassment at workplace?

The 2013 Act says the aggrieved woman may make, in writing, a complaint of sexual harassment. However, a written complaint is not mandatory. If she cannot give a written complaint, the Act says, any member of the ICC “shall” render “all reasonable assistance” to her for facilitating it. Also, if the woman is unable to make a complaint citing “physical or mental incapacity or death or otherwise”, her legal heir may do so.

Time-frame for making a complaint to ICC

According to the Act, the complaint of sexual harassment has to be made “within three months from the date of the incident”. If such incidents have taken place over a time, the complaint should be made within three months from the date of the last incident. However, the ICC has the discretion to “extend the time limit” if “it is satisfied that the circumstances were such which prevented the woman from filing a complaint within the said period”. The ICC needs to record these reasons to exercise the right.

after a complaint is made?

Once a complaint is made, the ICC can offer conciliation under Section 10 of the Act. Before starting an inquiry, the ICC may “at the request of the aggrieved woman, take steps to settle the matter between her and the respondent though conciliation”. It is to be seen, however, that “no monetary settlement shall be made as a basis of conciliation”.

If conciliation is not an option, the ICC may straightaway forward the complaint to the police under RELEVANT SECTIONS OF IPC (word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman) . Or, it can start its own inquiry and complete it within 90 days.

Enjoying powers similar to those of a civil court, the ICC can summon and examine any person on oath, can ask for production of related documents before it. During the inquiry, if the woman makes a written request, the ICC “may” also recommend her transfer, a three-month leave, or any other relief it deems fit. Once the inquiry is over, the ICC is to provide a report to the employer within 10 days, making available a copy of it to the victim too.

What happens after the ICC report?

If the ICC finds the allegations true, it will recommend to the company to take action against the accused for misconduct “in accordance with the provisions of the service rules”. In case the company does not have service rules, the recommended action may include disciplinary action, including a written apology, reprimand, warning, censure; withholding promotion/ pay raise/ increment; termination of service; counselling; community service.

The ICC can also recommend financial damages to the complainant. The amount can be decided taking into consideration “mental trauma, pain, suffering and emotional distress caused”, medical expenses incurred, loss of career opportunity, and income and financial status of the respondent.

Once the ICC furnishes its recommendations, the aggrieved woman or the respondent can challenge the report in a court of law within 90 days.

What happens to the ‘victim’ if her complaint is found to be false?

Section 14 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act deals with false complainant. If the ICC finds the complaint to be false, the Act says, it may recommend action against the woman or the person who has made the complaint. The Act, however, makes it clear that “a mere inability to substantiate a complaint or provide adequate proof need not attract legal action. Also, no action can be recommended against the complainant unless an inquiry establishes malicious intent on part of the complainant.

When just 5 paise can let you fight a legal battle for 41 years

The 5 paise coin had been out of circulation for decades. But this is exactly the amount on which 73-year-old Ranveer Singh Yadav has been fighting the case for more than 40 years. Lakhs of rupees have been spent over the years by both parties as legal fees, with the Delhi Transport Corporation as the complainant.

Back in 1973, Mr. Yadav worked as the conductor of the DTC bus. The charge against him was that he charged a female passenger 15 paise, gave her a ticket of 10 paise and gave an additional 5 rupees.Following an allegation of investigating the employees on the bus, an internal investigation took place and in 1976 he was dismissed.Although Mr. Yadav won a case in Labor Court in 1990, in which his dismissal was illegal, the transport body appealed the following year. Till now, it was Rs. 47,000 to contest the case.

Mr. Yadav said that my children also used to ask me if I cheated. "I will be in pain to convince those I have not cheated ... other people go on pilgrimage, I am going to court."

When the High Court rejected the DTC's petition in January this year, it allowed the transport body to pay Rs. 30,000 to Mr. Yadav. The court ruled that CPF should be paid a gratuity of Rs 22 lakh and another Rs 37 lakh as CPF.

During the hearing, the court asked the DTC how many lakhs have been spent on litigation to recover 5 paise.

"There is a case where the defendant has been fighting a long battle with the DTC for more than 40 years and has not reaped the fruit despite winning the case in the Labor Court and High Court," the court said. said.

Mr. Yadav's wife Vimala said, "Whether the case is of 5 paise or 2 paise, the way we have been punished for it is lakhs of rupees. Even the currency has disappeared, but We are still stranded. "

The High Court had asked DTC to pay Yadav a gratuity of 6 lakhs and other benefits and said, "Here is a case where the defendant has been fighting a long battle with DTC for more than 41 years And despite winning the case in Labor court. Court, he has not been able to cut the fruits. "

Here a legal maxim is fully enforced "Justice delayed is justice denied" Ranveer Singh Yadav has spent 41 years of his life to prove that he has not cheated anyone for 5 paise. And the value of that 5 paise was given to him for 41 years of life and legal battle of millions of rupees. .

WHEN GOVERNMENT PASSED COMMUNAL ORDER (State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan & C. R. Srinivasan) THE CASE CHANGED INDIAN RESERVATION SYSTEM ,INDIA SHOULD KNOW

 This case was filed in 1951 for fundamental right to get admission into educational institutions maintained by the State. this case has two stories one relates to Sri Srinivasan and another to Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan.

The State of Madras maintains four Medical Colleges at that time(in 1951) and only 330 seats were available for students in those four Colleges. Out of those 330 seats, 17 seats were reserved for students coming from outside the State and 12 seats were reserved for discretionary allotment by the State and the balance of the seats available were apportioned between four distinct groups of districts in the State.

Likewise, the State of Madras maintains four Engineering Colleges at that time( in 1951) and the total number of seats available for students in those Colleges were only 395. Out of those, 21 seats were reserved for students coming from outside the State, 12 seats were reserved for discretionary allotment by the State and the balance of the seats available were apportioned between the same four distinct groups of districts.
For many years before the commencement of the Constitution, the seats in both the Medical Colleges and the Engineering Colleges so apportioned between the four distinct groups of districts used to be filled up according to certain proportions set forth in what used to be called the Communal GOVERMENT ORDER. Thus, for every 14 seats to be filled by the selection committee, candidates used to be selected strictly on the following basis:

Non-Brahmins (Hindus) ... 6
Backward Hindus ... 2
Brahmins ... 2
Harijans ... 2
Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians ... 1
Muslims ... 1
Subject to the aforesaid regional and what have been claimed to be protective provisions selection from among the applicants from a particular community from one of the groups of districts used to be made on certain principles based on academic qualifications and marks obtained by the candidates

In the case of the Medical Colleges where Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan had applied for admission, not less than 20 per cent. of the total number of seats available for students of the State were filled by women candidates separately for each region, it being open to the selection committee to admit a larger number of woman candidates in any region if qualified candidates were available in that region and if they were eligible for selection on merits vis-a-vis the men candidates in accordance with the general principles governing such admissions as laid down in those rules. It appears that the proportion fixed in the old Communal G. O. has been adhered to even after the commencement of the Constitution on 26-1-1950. Indeed, G. O. No. 2208, dated l6-6-1950, laying down rules for the selection of candidates for admission into the Medical Colleges substantially reproduces the communal proportion fixed in the old Communal Government order.

Proceedings At  Supreme Court

Sri Srinivasan who had actually applied for admission into the Govt. Engineering College at Guindy, filed a CASE (petition). praying for a writ of mandamus or any other writ restraining the State of Madras all officers thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the Communal G. O. in and by which admission into the Engineering College was sought to be regulated in such manner as to infringe and involve the violation of the fundamental right of the Sri Srinivasan . under Art. 15 (1)(The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them) and Art. 29 (2) (No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them) of the Constitution, in the affidavit filed in support of his petition. the Sri Srinivasan. has stated that he had passed the Intermediate Examination held in March 1950 in Group 1, passing the said examination in first class and obtaining marks set out in para. 1 of his affidavit.

It will appear that in the optional which are taken into consideration in determining the academic test for admission in the Engineering College the  Srinivasan secured 369 marks out of a maximum of 450 marks. The High court has by the same judgment allowed this application in favour of Sri Srinivasan also and the State of madras  filed an appeal which has been numbered 271 of 1951. The learned counsel appearing for the State of Madras conceded that these two applicants would have been admitted to the educational institutions they intended to join and they would not have been denied admission if selections had been made on merits alone.

Art.29 'Cultural and Educational Rights' runs as follows:

"(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.

(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them."

It will be noticed that while Cl. (1) protects the language, script or culture of a section of the citizens, cl. (2) guarantees the fundamental right of an individual citizen. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in Cl. (2) is a right which an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. If a citizen who seeks admission into any such educational institution has not the requisite academic qualifications and is denied admission on that ground, he certainly cannot be heard to complain of an infraction of his fundamental right under this Article. But, on the other hand, if he has the academic qualifications but is refused admission only on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, then there is a clear breach of his fundamental right.

The learned Advocate- General appearing for the State of madras contends that the provisions of this Article have to be read along with other Articles in the Constitution. He urges that Art. 46 charges the State with promoting with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaken sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and with protecting them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. It is pointed out that although this Article finds a place in Part IV of the Constitution which lays down certain directive principles of State policy and though the provisions contained in that Part are not enforceable by any Ct. the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental for the governance of the country and Art. 37 makes it obligatory on the part of the State to apply those principles in making laws.

The argument is that having regard to the provisions of Art. 46, the State is entitled to maintain the Communal G. O. fixing proportionate seats for different communities and if because of that Order, which is thus contended to be valid in law and not in violation of the Constitution, the petnrs. are unable to get admissions into the educational institutions, there is no infringement of their fundamental rights. Indeed, the learned Advocate-General of Madras even contends that the provisions of Art. 46 override the provisions of Art. 29 (2). We reject the above noted contentions completely. The directive principles of the State policy, which by Art. 37 are expressly made unenforceable by a Ct. cannot override the provisions found in Part III which, notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by appropriate Writs, Orders or directions under Art. 32.

The chapter of Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any Legislative or Executive act or order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate Art. in Part III. The directive principles of State policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter of Fundamental Rights. In our opinion, that is the correct way in which the provisions found in Parts III and IV have to be understood. However, so long as there is no infringement of any Fundamental Right, to the extent conferred by the provisions in Part III, there can be no objection to the State acting in accordance with the directive principles set out in Part IV, but subject again to the Legislative and Executive powers and limitations conferred on the State under different provisions of the Constitution.

. In the next place it will be noticed that Art. 16 which guarantees the fundamental right of equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and provides that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste , sex , descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State also includes a specific clauses in the following terms:
"(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments of posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State , is not adequately represented in the services under the State."
  

SUPREME COURT' OF INDIA'S FINDING 

If the argument founded on Art. 46 were sound then cl. (4) of Art. 16 would have been wholly unnecessary and redundant. Seeing, however, that cl. (4) was inserted in Art. 16, the omission of such an express provision from Art. 29 cannot but be regarded as significant. It may well be that the intention of the Constitution was not to introduce at all communal considerations in matters of admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. The protection of backward classes of citizens may require appointment of members of backward classes in State services and the reason why power has been given to the State to provide for reservation of such appointments for backward classes may under those circumstances be understood. That consideration, however, was not obviously considered necessary in the case of admission into an educational institution and that may well be the reason for the omission from Art. 29 of a clause similar to cl. (4) of Art, 16.

Take the case of the petnr. Srinivasan. It is not disputed that he secured a much larger number of marks than the marks secured by many of the Non-Brahmin candidates and yet the Non. Brahmin candidates who secured less number of marks will be admitted into six out of every 14 seats but the petnr. Srinivasan will not be admitted into any of them. What is the reason for this denial of admission except that he is a Brahmin and not a Non-Brahmin. He may have secured higher marks than the Anglo Indian and Indian Christians or Muslim candidates but, nevertheless, he cannot get any of the seats reserved for the last mentioned communities for no fault of his except that he is a Brahmin and not a member of the aforesaid communities. Such denial of admission cannot but be regarded as made on ground only of his caste.

It is argued that the petnrs. are not denied admission only because they are Brahmins but for a variety of reasons, e. g. (a) they are Brahmins, (b) Brahmins have an allotment of only two seats out of 14 and (c) the two seats have already been filled up by more meritorious Brahmin candidates. This may be true so far as these two seats reserved for the Brahmins are concerned but this line of argument can have no force when we come to consider the seats reserved for candidates of other communities, for so far as those seats are concerned, the petnrs. are denied admission into any of them not on any ground other than the sole ground of their being Brahmins and not being members of the community for whom those reservations have been made. The classification in the Communil G. O. proceeds on the basis of religion, race and caste. In our view, the classification made in the Communal G. O. is opposed to the Constitution and constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen under Art. 29 (2) In this view of the matter, we do not find it necessary to consider the effect of Art. 14 or 15 on the specific Articles discussed above.

For the reasons stated above, we are of opinion that the Communal Government Order. being inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 29 (2) in Part III of the Constitution is void under Art 13. The result, therefore, is that these appeals  filed by state of madras stand dismissed with costs.

Sri Srinivasan and  Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan won the case .

what if  they had not challenged the COMMUNAL GOVERNMENT ORDER IN THE court ?

then system would not be changed. Sri Srinivasan and  Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan were aware of there rights . their awareness changed the whole system. 

SO ALL OF YOU SHOULD AWARE ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS BECAUSE AWARNESS IS THE ONLY THING TO FIGHT AGAINST THE ODD'S OF SOCIETY ,

THANKS FOR READING 

REGARDS 

ADV SHASHIVEER SHARMA

The Right Empowers YOU to SPEECH , YOU MUST KNOW ( RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH & EXPRESSION)

Right to freedom of speech & expression is FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN OF INDIA  .

   Article 19 (1) A of INDIAN CONSTITUTION

  guarantees to all the citizens right to freedom of speech and expression. this right is most important right not because it not only assures the condition necessary for democracy but also for a civilized life. The ability to express our opinion and speak freely is essential to bring about change in society

WHAT IS Freedom of Speech & EXPRESSION  AS PER INDIAN CONSTITUTION ?

Freedom of speech enjoys special position as far India is concerned. The importance of freedom of expression and speech can be easily understand by the fact that preamble of constitution itself ensures to all citizens inter alia, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. The constitutional significance of the freedom of speech consists in the Preamble of Constitution and is transformed as fundamental and human right in Article 19(1) (a) as “freedom of speech and expression”. Explaining the scope of freedom of speech and expression Supreme Court has said that the words "freedom of speech and expression" must be broadly constructed to include the freedom to circulate one's views by words of mouth or in writing or through audiovisual instrumentalists. Freedom of Speech and expression means the right to express one's own convictions and opinions freely by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures or any other mode. It thus includes the expression of one's idea through any communicable medium or visible representation, such as gesture, signs, and the like.

This ALSO includes the right to express your views aloud (for example through public protest and demonstrations) or through:

• published articles, books or leaflets
• television or radio broadcasting
• works of art
• the internet and social media

.

IS THERE ANY RESTRICTIONS  ON RIGHT TO FREEDOM?

Article 19(2) in The Constitution Of India 

Grounds of Restrictions

It is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression in a democracy, so also it is necessary to place some restrictions on this freedom for the maintenance of social order, because no freedom can be absolute or completely unrestricted. Accordingly, under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India, the State may make a law imposing “reasonable restrictions” on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression “in the interest of” the public on the following grounds: Clause (2) of Article 19 of Indian constitution contains the grounds on which restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression can be imposed:-

1) Security of State: Security of state is of vital importance and a government must have power to impose restriction on the activity affecting it. Under Article 19(2) reasonable restrictions can be imposed on freedom of speech and expression in the interest of security of State. However the term “security” is very crucial one. The term "security of state" refers only to serious and aggravated forms of public order e.g. rebellion, waging war against the State, insurrection and not ordinary breaches of public order and public safety, e.g. unlawful assembly, riot, affray. Thus speeches or expression on the part of an individual, which incite to or encourage the commission of violent crimes, such as, murder are matters, which would undermine the security of State.

2) Friendly relations with foreign states: In the present global world, a country has to maintain good and friendly relationship with other countries. Something which has potential to affect such relation ship should be checked by government. Keeping this thing in mind, this ground was added by the constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The object behind the provision is to prohibit unrestrained malicious propaganda against a foreign friendly state, which may jeopardize the maintenance of good relations between India, and that state.

No similar provision is present in any other Constitution of the world. In India, the Foreign Relations Act, (XII of 1932) provides punishment for libel by Indian citizens against foreign dignitaries. Interest of friendly relations with foreign States, would not justify the suppression of fair criticism of foreign policy of the Government. However it is interesting to note that member of the commonwealth including Pakistan is not a "foreign state" for the purposes of this Constitution. The result is that freedom of speech and expression cannot be restricted on the ground that the matter is adverse to Pakistan.

3) Public Order: Next restriction prescribed by constitution is to maintain public order. This ground was added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act. 'Public order' is an expression of wide connotation and signifies "that state of tranquility which prevails among the members of political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established."

Here it is pertinent to look into meaning of the word “Public order. Public order is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. 'Public order' is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. Anything that disturbs public tranquility or public peace disturbs public order. Thus communal disturbances and strikes promoted with the sole object of accusing unrest among workmen are offences against public order. Public order thus implies absence of violence and an orderly state of affairs in which citizens can peacefully pursue their normal avocation of life. Public order also includes public safety. Thus creating internal disorder or rebellion would affect public order and public safety. But mere criticism of government does not necessarily disturb public order.

The words 'in the interest of public order' includes not only such utterances as are directly intended to lead to disorder but also those that have the tendency to lead to disorder. Thus a law punishing utterances made with the deliberate intention to hurt the religious feelings of any class of persons is valid because it imposes a restriction on the right of free speech in the interest of public order since such speech or writing has the tendency to create public disorder even if in some case those activities may not actually lead to a breach of peace. But there must be reasonable and proper nexus or relationship between the restrictions and the achievements of public order.

4) Decency or morality: The way to express something or to say something should be decent one. It should not affect the morality of the society adversely. Our constitution has taken care of this view and inserted decency and morality as a ground. The words 'morality or decency' are words of wide meaning. Sections 292 to 294 of the Indian Penal Code provide instances of restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression in the interest of decency or morality. These sections prohibit the sale or distribution or exhibition of obscene words, etc. in public places. No fix standard is laid down till now as to what is moral and indecent. The standard of morality varies from time to time and from place to place.

5) Contempt of Court: In a democratic country Judiciary plays very important role. In such situation it becomes essential to respect such institution and its order. Thus, restriction on the freedom of speech and expression can be imposed if it exceeds the reasonable and fair limit and amounts to contempt of court. According to the Section 2 'Contempt of court' may be either 'civil contempt' or 'criminal contempt.' But now, Indian contempt law was amended in 2006 to make “truth” a defence. However, even after such amendment a person can be punished for the statement unless they were made in public interest. Again in Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn. vs R.K.Jain, it was held by court that, “Truth based on the facts should be allowed as a valid defence if courts are asked to decide contempt proceedings relating to contempt proceeding relating to a speech or an editorial or article”. The qualification is that such defence should not cover-up to escape from the consequences of a deliberate effort to scandalize the court.

6) Defamation: Ones’ freedom, be it of any type, must not affect the reputation or status another person. A person is known by his reputation more than his wealth or any thing else. Constitution considers it as ground to put restriction on freedom of speech. Basically, a statement, which injures a man's reputation, amounts to defamation. Defamation consists in exposing a man to hatred, ridicule, or contempt. The civil law in relating to defamation is still uncodified in India and subject to certain exceptions.

7) Incitement to an offence: This ground was also added by the constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. Obviously, freedom of speech and expression cannot confer a right to incite people to commit offence. The word 'offence' is defined as any act or omission made punishable by law for the time being in force.

8) Sovereignty and integrity of India- To maintain sovereignty and integrity of a state is prime duty of government. Taking into it into account, freedom of speech and expression can be restricted so as not to permit any one to challenge sovereignty or to permit any one to preach something which will result in threat to integrity of the country.

From above analysis, it is evident that Grounds contained in Article 19(2) show that they are all concerned with the national interest or in the interest of the society. The first set of grounds i.e. the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States and public order are all grounds referable to national interest, whereas, the second set of grounds i.e. decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence are all concerned with the interest of the society.

THE CASE THAT INDIA SHOULD KNOW 'The “Best Bakery” Case

The Best Bakery case, in which 14 people were killed on March 1, 2002 during the Gujarat carnage, had become one of the most high-profile cases of the violence that erupted across Gujarat after the Godhra train incident. Following is the chronology of events in the Best Bakery case:

March 1, 2002: Best Bakery in Vadodara is burnt down by a mob, killing 14 persons.

March 2, 2002: Main complainant Zaheera Sheikh files first information report naming the accused.

March 21, 2002: Zaheera appears before National Human Rights Commission and demands justice.

May 7, 2003: Zaheera's brother Nafitullah and sister Saira retract statements in fast track court in Vadodara, which first conducted the trial in Best Bakery case.

May 17, 2003: Zaheera turns hostile in the fast track court, saying she cannot identity the accused. On the same day, Zaheera's mother Sahrunissa and younger brother Naseebullah deny their statements given to police.

June 27, 2003: Additional sessions judge H U Mahida of Vadodara fast track court acquits all the 21 accused in the case who were named by Zaheera in her statements before police and NHRC.

July 7, 2003: Zaheera names BJP legislator Madhu Srivastava for intimidating her into turning hostile. She demands retrial outside Gujarat.

July 11, 2003: Zaheera gives statement on oath before NHRC in the presence of Teesta Setalvad, secretary of Citizens for Justice and Peace, about how she was forced to retract her statements in the court. She also names those who threatened her and her family to retract her statement

August 7, 2003: Gujarat government challenges the fast track court's verdict acquitting the accused by filing an appeal in Gujarat high court.

September 29, 2003: Gujarat government challenges the fast track court's order in the high court with an amended appeal.

December 26, 2003: Gujarat high court dismisses appeal filed by Gujarat government challenging acquittal of accused by the fast track court.

March 12, 2004: Supreme Court admits Gujarat government's appeal against acquittal.

April 12, 2004: Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Doraiswamy Raju and Justice Arijit Pasayat order retrial of Best Bakery case outside Gujarat, in Maharashtra.

September 9, 2004: Nafitullah Sheikh, brother of Zaheera, records statement before Vadodara police on threats meted out to him.

September 22, 2004: Charges framed against 17 accused in Mumbai court by judge Abhay Thipsay. Four other accused were declared absconding.

October 4, 2004: Trial begins in the special court in Mumbai presided over by Judge Abhay Thipsay.

November 3, 2004: Another turnaround by Zaheera, says that her statement given in fast track court at Vadodara was correct.

January 1, 2005: Tehelka magazine stings Vadodara MLA Madhu Srivastava and his cousin Batthoo saying they paid her Rs 18 lakh to change her testimony.

January 10, 2005: SC directs Registrar General BM Gupta to conduct a probe into the basis of Zaheera’s statements and the affidavits filed by Setalvad in the apex court.

August 24, 2005: The SC committee submits its report, calling Zaheera a 'self-condemned liar' who had fallen to inducements to give inconsistent statements. It gives a clean chit to Setalvad.

February 24, 2006: A Mumbai sessions court convicts and gives life imprisonment to nine of the 17 accused facing trial. It also issues notices to Zaheera and her family for tendering false evidence.

February 2, 2008: I-T dept slaps Rs 38-lakh tax notice on Zahira Sheikh

July 9, 2012: Mumbai HC acquits 5 in the case, life term to 4 upheld